Resolving a conflict among the DCAs, Florida’s Supreme Court broadens the protections of Florida’s anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) statute by allowing interlocutory review of nonfinal orders that deny motions brought under the anti-SLAPP statute.
The path to Florida’s Supreme Court for Vericker v. Powell, — So.3d —, 2025 WL 922413 (Fla. March 27, 2025) began when Powell, North Bay Village’s attorney, filed suit against Vericker, a local political blogger who published posts on his blog about Powell, for defamation per se. After discovery, Vericker moved for summary judgment combined with an anti-SLAPP motion, in which Vericker contended that Powell was a public-official and was required to prove that Vericker published the posts with actual malice. The trial court denied Vericker’s summary judgment/anti- SLAPP motion pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 768.295. Vericker elevated the matter to the Third DCA by filing a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the order denying his anti-SLAPP motion. The Third DCA acknowledged the open question of whether certiorari is a proper basis for reviewing the denial of anti-SLAPP motions due to the competing positions of the Second DCA (supporting it) and the Fourth DCA (disagreeing it creates a new category of appealable nonfinal orders). Siding with its neighboring district, the Third DCA concluded that certiorari is not appropriate; instead, the non-final appeal rule should be amended to address the public policy at issue.
Florida’s Supreme Court stepped-in based on the certified conflict. In Justice Grosshans’s near-unanimous opinion, the Court began its analysis by recognizing that the writ of certiorari has been historically used to remedy rulings that depart from the essential requirements of law and cannot otherwise be corrected on appeal from a final order. So, the Court reasoned, the writ is proper only in extraordinary circumstances and in the context of a review proceeding that is
substantially more limited than an appeal. Focusing on its structure and text, the Court found that the anti-SLAPP statute neither expressly provides traditional immunity from suit, nor any clues that might support an absolute right to be free from litigation. Rather, it concluded that the “Anti- SLAPP statute, in fact, suggests that a successful Anti-SLAPP claimant will have to endure some level of litigation” since case dispositive motions and hearings are necessary. Therefore, the Court affirmed the Third DCA’s decision by holding the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion does not result
in harm sufficient to support certiorari relief.
But the Court did not stop there. It also divined that “the statute’s text conveys the Legislature’s objective that lawsuits targeting protected speech be expeditiously resolved” and cited the “unique timing requirement that is not part of typical civil cases, as claims must be resolved ‘at the earliest possible time’ once the necessary filings are submitted.” The Court also recognized that the statute deters violations of speech-chilling lawsuits through attorney-fee awards and actual
damages. Based on the Legislature’s intent, and a recent proposal to amend Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130, the Court held that immediate review of nonfinal orders denying qualifying anti-SLAPP motions was needed, relying on its “constitutional authority to ensure that Florida’s procedural rules of court manifest the substantive legal enactments of the Legislature.” Accordingly, through a separate opinion, the Court amended Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.130(a)(3) to authorize review of this class of nonfinal orders, which includes Fla. Stat. §§ 718.1224, 720.304(4), and 768.295.